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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1962
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
AND PROGRAM REGULATION-VIOLATION
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY
AND ITS CONTROL
Probably no other industry has so captured the interest of the
American public or shown such phenomenal yearly growth as the
industry of television. Since the first commercial television broad-
cast over WBNT, New York, in 1941,1 the number of operating sta-
tions has grown over the past two decades to 542, with construction
permits authorized for nearly one hundred more.2 The number of
television sets in use in the United States has increased from only
8,000 in 1946 to 54,000,000 sets in use in 1960.3 In 1957 the average
family in a television home viewed the medium's programs on the
average of five hours in each day.4 The impact of television has
made itself felt in the economic world also. The expenditures for
television advertising have, from 1950 to 1960, climbed from $185,-
000,000 or 3.3 per cent of the market total to $1,495,000,000 or 13.8
per cent of the market total.5
Such a dynamic industry is almost certainly going to be the
object of controversy. A necessary companion to such controversy
is the problem of control-what can be done to change or stabilize
the industry, and with whom does this power lie? Congress first
answered this question with the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, 6
which was subsequently replaced by the Communications Act of
1934.7 The power of the United States government to regulate the
radio and television industry rests upon its constitutional power
1 GOLENPAuL AssocIATEs, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAc 290 (1962).
The first successful demonstration of television, however, occurred
nearly twenty years before in the early 1920's. Ibid.
2 Id. at 310. These figures include the territories and possessions of the
United States.
3 Id. at 407.
4 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Network
Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1958).
5 GOLENPAUL ASSOCIATES, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 582 (1962).
6 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). This act included television in its definition of
radio transmission although not specifically named as such.
7 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1958).
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over interstate commerce." The delegation of this power to an
administrative agency 9 has been upheld. 0
The question of who possesses the legal power to regulate the
industry having long been settled, the task remains to determine
the nature and extent of that power. The scope of this comment
will, for the purposes set out below, be limited to the power of the
FCC to regulate and supervise programs and program schedules
presented by the individual station licensees. The purpose here
is to comment upon the nature of the power Congress vested in the
FCC pertaining to the programming area, to discuss the limitations
upon that power, to discuss the criteria used by the FCC in the
regulation of the radio and television industry, and to analyze the
various possible approaches to delineating the extent of regulation
the FCC should have in this area.
II. STATUTORY HISTORY OF RADIO AND
TELEVISION REGULATION
Prior to the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, an expanding
American radio industry found itself hampered by certain techni-
cal limitations inherent in the medium. The spectrum of available
frequencies was, and still is, physically limited as to the number
of stations that could broadcast in any one geographical area."
Too many stations in an area created an overlapping of station fre-
quencies, and the interference caused by this overlapping served
to further reduce the number of stations the listening audience
could effectively receive.
The Radio Act of 1927 sought to alleviate this problem by author-
izing the Federal Radio Commission to grant licenses to persons
who wished to broadcast, and by prohibiting broadcasting over the
air-waves without procuring such a license.12  Congress further
8 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
9 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). The FCC is composed of
seven members, appointed by the President of the United States with
the consent of the Senate for seven year terms. In addition, the Com-
mission has authority to appoint any employees that are necessary to
carry out the provisions of the Communications Act. 48 Stat. 1066
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
10 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
11 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
132 Id. at 474: "Unless Congress had exercised its power over interstate
commerce to bring about allocation of available frequencies . . . the
result would have been an impairment of the effective use of these
facilities by anyone. The fundamental purpose of Congress in respect
of broadcasting was the allocation and regulation of the use of radio
frequencies by prohibiting such use except under licensing."
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provided for assuring proper use of licensed facilities by giving
the FRC the power to grant or refuse renewals of licenses after
expiration of the original license grants.13 In 1934, Congress passed
the Communications Act to consolidate the various statutes pre-
viously enacted to control the various methods of communication. 14
The essentials of the Radio Act of 1927, however, remained un-
changed in the Communications Act, indicating that Congress had
no intention of increasing or decreasing the existing regulation of
the radio industry.15
It is clear from the language of the Communications Act that
Congress considered the air-waves inappropriate for private owner-
ship. Control of such air-waves should at all times, according to
the Congressional mandate, remain in the United States. 1 6  In
defining the control of the United States, through the FCC, Con-
gress provided that all decisions made by that commission should
be governed by the "public interest, convenience, or necessity,"'17
and the courts have held this criterion to be sufficient.' 8
The FCC has sought to define the broad standard of public in-
terest through its many administrative functions, such as rule-
making, general policy statements, license grants and renewals and
comparative hearings. At this time it is pertinent to describe the
procedure employed by the FCC in granting or renewing licenses.
The Commission first determines the number of television
stations that may broadcast efficiently in any one area and the
particular portion of the frequency spectrum in which each may
broadcast. 19 If there is only one applicant seeking an available fre-
13 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (1927): "Upon the expiration of any license, upon
application therefore, a renewal of such license may be granted from
time to time ......
14 The history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of
1934 is discussed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-14 (1943).
15 Ibid.
16 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958): "It is the purpose of this
chapter... to maintain the control of the United States over all chan-
nels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for
the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for
limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal Authority,
and no such license shall be construed to create any right beyond the
terms, conditions, and periods of the license."
17 48 Stat. 1082-85 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), 309(a) (1958).
18 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
19 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 3.606 (1960) (table of assignments); Sixth Report
and Order, S. Doc. No. 8736, April 14, 1952, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952).
The number of assignments in the Report roughly correlates with the
size of the city.
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quency, the Commission will issue a construction permit if the ap-
plicant can demonstrate that he is legally, financially, and other-
wise qualified, and that he will operate his station in the public
interest. If construction requirements are met by the applicant,
he receives a license to broadcast from the FCC which expires after
three years operation.20  If, however, there are two or more ap-
plicants seeking the same frequency, the FCC is required to hold
comparative hearings to select the best qualified applicant.21 In
selecting the applicant the Commission is currently using the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) proposed programming and policies, (2) local
ownership, (3) integration of ownership and management, (4)
participation in civic activities, (5) record of past broadcast per-
formance, (6) broadcast experience, (7) relative likelihood of
effectuation of proposals as shown by contacts made with local
groups and similar efforts, (8) carefulness of operational planning
for television, (9) staffing, (10) diversification of the background
of the controlling person, and (11) diversification of control of
mediums of mass communications. 22 In making its determination,
the Commission does not give equal emphasis to all of the above
elements.23
At the expiration of the original license grant, the licensee
must file for renewal to continue broadcasting. In a renewal appli-
cation, the licensee sets out his programming for a composite week
of the last year of his license term. The FCC compares this with
the proposed program schedule the licensee set out in his previous
application.2 4 If there are large differences between the proposed
schedule and the actual record, the FCC brings this to the attention
20 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1958); 47 C.F.R. § 3.630 (1960)
(license period): "Licenses for television broadcast stations ordinarily
will be issued for a period of three years and, when regularly renewed
at three year intervals thereafter; Provided, however, that, if the Com-
mission finds that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will
be served thereby, it may issue either an initial license or a renewal
therefor for a lesser term."
21 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1958); Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1946).
22 Letter of August 30, 1956, to chairman Warren G. Magnuson of the In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, U.S. Senate Hearings on
S. Res. 13 and 163, Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 979 (1956).
23 Id. at 980: "[D]iversification of background or persons controlling,
participation in civic activities, or carefulness of planning for television
do not carry the same weight as the others."
24 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Network
Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1958).
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of the licensee and an attempt is made to reconcile the situation.
With rare exceptions, the FCC has usually granted renewals of the
licensees.
25
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE REGULATORY POWER
OF THE FCC
As noted in the preceding section, the FCC considers the pro-
gramming policies of an applicant when granting or renewing a
license. At first glance, it would appear that the "public interest"
standard provided by Congress would give the FCC this power.
That the term "public interest" was to be given a broad interpreta-
tion was indicated by the Supreme Court of the United States six
years after the passage of the Communications Act in FCC v. Sand-
ers Bros. Radio Station,2 6 when it stated that "an important element
of public interest" to be considered in issuing a license is "the
ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service to the
community reached by his broadcasts. '27 Three years later the
Supreme Court again gave a broad interpretation to the meaning of
"public interest" in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,28
by stating that such interest is "the interest of the listening public
in larger more effective use of radio.
29
In defining the power of the Commission to act in the public
interest, however, it is necessary to consider this power in the light
of limitations provided in section 326 of the Communications Act
itself,30 and in the first amendment to the Constitution.31  The
programs broadcast by the radio and television industry are within
the protection afforded by the first amendment, 32 and the FCC has
25 Id. at 45.
26 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
27 Id. at 475.
28 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (hereinafter referred to as the NBC case).
29 Id. at 216.
30 48 Stat. 1091 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1958): "Nothing in this chapter
shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated
or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication."
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . ... "
32 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948): "We
have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio are in-
cluded in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment."
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declared that "it may not condition the grant, denial or revocation
of a broadcast license upon its own subjective determination of what
is or what is not a good program.133
At least one early writer sought to distinguish the various
types of programs by asserting that the protection of the first
amendment did not extend to programs which were solely musi-
cal or entertaining in nature, as the protection merely extended
to the communication of ideas.34 This theory was rejected, how-
ever, in Winters v. New York,35 when the Supreme Court stated:
We do not accede to the appellee's suggestion that the constitu-
tional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of
ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is
too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What
is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.
Section 326 of the Communications Act was incorporated with-
out change from the Radio Act of 1927.36 The principal sponsor of
the radio legislation in the House of Representatives was Represen-
tative White of Maine. A portion of the debate on the floor of the
House between Mr. White and F. H. LaGuardia of New York indi-
cates the attitude toward the meaning of section 326:37
M/fr. LaGuardia. The gentleman states the recommendations,
among which was a guaranty of free speech over the radio. What
provision does the bill make to carry that out?
Mr. White of Maine. It does not touch that matter specifically.
Personally, I felt that we could go no further than the Federal
Constitution goes in that respect. The pending bill gives the Sec-
retary no power of interfering with freedom of speech in any de-
gree.
Mr. LaGuardia. It is the belief of the Gentleman and the intent
of Congress in passing this bill not to give the Secretary any power
whatever in that respect in considering a licensee or the revoca-
tion of a license.
Mr. White of Maine. No power at all.
Having noted that judicial and congressional opinion has de-
clared that the programs of a licensee are to be afforded the pro-
tection of the first amendment and section 326 of the Communica-
33 NETWORK PROGRAMnMNG INQuIRY, REPORT AND STATEMENT OF PoLcY,
25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293 (1960).
34 Caldwell, Censorship of Radio Programs, 1 J. RADIO L. 441, 475 (1931):
"Whenever it is a question of musical or entertainment programs,
solely, then the Commission has broad discretion to grant or deny ap-
plication for license or renewals thereof ... "
35 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
36 See 78 CoNG. REC. 10988 (1934).
37 67 CoNG. REC. 5480 (1927).
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tions Act, it becomes necessary to determine the nature and limits
of that protection. In Near v. Minnesota,38 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute under which the publication of a news-
paper had been enjoined following malicious and defamatory edi-
tions. Chief Justice Hughes, for the majority, stated that "liberty
of the press . . .has meant principally, although not exclusively,
immunity from previous restraints or censorship . . . . 39 This is
not the same, however, as saying that programs may not be viewed
without censoring by an administrative agency prior to their ex-
hibition. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,40 the Supreme
Court held that an administrative agency has the right to view
motion pictures before they are exhibited to the public. The Court,
however, did not deal with the censoring activities of the agency
after they have viewed the pictures. 41
Thus, it would seem that the FCC may require licensees to
submit their programs to the Commission for viewing before these
programs are broadcast. Such viewing would not violate the
first amendment as long as the Commission did not enter a value
judgment upon the programs which would affect the broadcaster's
right to exhibit them. However, if the Commission did exercise
its judgment over the programs viewed, it would seem that the
Near case should be controlling and any restraint of a program
by the FCC would have to be within the exceptions to the first
amendment as stated in Near.
In the Sanders case42 the Supreme Court seemed to remove
consideration of programs from the Commission by stating:
[T]he Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licensee.
The Commission is given no supervisory control of the programs,
of business management or of policy. In short, the broadcasting
field is open to anyone, provided there be an available frequency
over which he can broadcast without interference to others, if he
shows competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and financial
ability to make good use of the assigned channel.
However, three years later in the NBC case43 the Court indicated
that, while the Commission had no supervisory control of pro-
38 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
39 Id. at 716. The Court stated, however, that exceptional cases such as
obscene publications, publications which endanger national security in
time of war, and publications which incite the populace to acts of vio-
lence to overthrow the government would not be afforded the benefits
of the previous restraints doctrine.
40 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
41 See 40 NEB. L. REv. 491, 499 (1961); 61 CoL.m. L. REv. 921 (1961).
42 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
4.3 19 U.S. 190 (1943).
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grams, it could look to the schedule of such programs in deter-
mining whether or not an applicant was qualified for a license.
The Court reasoned that the FCC could not discharge its obliga-
tion to act in the public interest merely by finding no "technolog-
ical objections" to granting a license, as this would not insure the
"best practicable service to the community reached by his broad-
casts. '44 Instead, the Communications Act which regulates the
radio traffic "puts upon the Commission the burden of determin-
ing the composition of that traffic. '45 Much of the reasoning be-
hind allowing the Commission to consider the merits of program-
ming lies in the fact that the facilities for radio are limited,4 and,
since not everyone can have access to these facilities, the Com-
mission must judge as to which applicants are best qualified to
serve the public.
The extent of the Commission's power as interpreted in the
NBC case is not entirely clear. In the same year that the case
was decided one writer asserted that determining "composition"
is distinct from determining "content" of traffic: the former deal-
ing with the over-all level of programs, and the latter dealing
with the quality of individual programs.47 This seems to be the
position adopted by the FCC which has thus far abstained from
rendering judgments as to particular programs, 48 but which still
44 Id. at 216.
45 Ibid.
46 Id. at 226.
47 Barber, Competition, Free Speech and FCC Network Regulations, 12
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 34, 49 (1943): "It seems reasonable to conclude
that the Court meant 'composition' in its legal sense. The word has
been used frequently in connection with freight traffic over a railroad
line where the public is interested in the freight being composed of
commodities generally. This interest would not be served by a rail
line that carries only farm produce and refuses manufactured products
and the regulatory agency in the field would see that no such dis-
crimination is practiced. It does not mean, however, that such an
agency would have any directorial power as to whether a particular
car, or even a particular train hauls oranges, household goods, or
furniture. Likewise, the public interest in the composition of radio
traffic does not mean that the regulatory agency can insist that any
particular public discussion, entertainment or musical program shall
or shall not be carried on a specific local radio program or chain
broadcast. It does mean, however, that the regulatory body can con-
cern itself with the general level of programs and see that no particular
type of program or particular points of view are carried to the ex-
clusion or at the expense of all other types of programs and points of
view."
48 NETWORK PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, REPORT AND STATEMENT OF POLICY,
25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293 (1960).
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maintains the authority to consider the balance of the program-
ming schedule.49 The Commission's position received the ap-
proval of the Supreme Court in 1950, when it declared that "the
qualifications of the licensee and the character of its broad-
casts may be weighed in determining whether or not to grant a
license." 50
In the area of renewal, the courts have also allowed the FCC
to investigate program proposals and to review past broadcast
performance. 51  The reasoning responsible for these holdings is
perhaps best expressed in Sangamon Valley Television Corp.:
52
Such past records take on importance in evaluating the applicant's
proposals, since a licensee's past operating record is a demonstra-
tion of its ability to meet and fulfill its obligation to the public.
In KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC,5 ' the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia declared that reviewing the past conduct
of a licensee did not infringe upon the protection of the first
amendment by stating:
There has been no attempt on the part of the commission to sub-
ject any part of the appellant's broadcasting matter to scrutiny
prior to its release. In considering whether the public interest,
convenience, or necessity will be served by a renewal of the ap-
pellant's license, the commission has merely exercised its un-
doubted right to take note of appellant's past conduct, which is not
censorship.
It may thus be seen that, although section 326 of the Com-
munciations Act and the first amendment of the Constitution pro-
tect the right of free speech, under judicial holdings the FCC
may nevertheless enter the general area of programming without
impinging upon those protections.
IV. THE PRESENT STATUS OF PROGRAM REGULATION
BY THE FCC
The previous section noted that the FCC has the authority to
consider future program proposals and past conduct of an appli-
cant without violating the limitations imposed upon it.
49 Id. at 7294.
50 Regents of University System of Ga. v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 598
(1950).
il Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183
F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950); Greater Kampeska Radio Corp. v. FCC, 108 F.
2d 5 (D.C. Cir. 1939); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1931).
52 22 FCC 1167, 1168 (1957).
53 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
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The Commission currently maintains that the primary right
and responsibility of choosing programs remains with the individ-
ual station licensee, and that the Commission merely reviews his
past actions and future proposals to see that an over-all balance
in the public interest is maintained. 54 In considering the over-all
balance of a program schedule, the FCC has stated that the fol-
lowing elements are important:
(1) Opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development
and use of local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious
programs, (5) educational programs, (6) public affairs programs,
(7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) ag-
ricultural programs, (10) news programs, (11) weather and mar-
ket reports, (12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups,
(14) entertainment programming. 55
By emphasizing the above elements, the FCC has come very close
to requiring that each category be assigned some broadcast time
by an applicant,5 6 although the Commission has stated that these
elements are not intended "as a rigid mold or fixed formula for
station operation. ' 5 7
Further, although the Commission has recognized that net-
work programs "are the principal broadcast fare of the vast ma-
jority of television stations,"5 8 the greatest emphasis is placed
upon the amount of local live programming that the applicant has
proposed or broadcast in the past.59 The reasoning behind the
unequal emphasis is based upon section 370 (b) of the Communi-
cations Act which requires the FCC to "make such distribution
of licenses ... among the several States and communities as to
provide a fair, efficient and equitable distribution to each of the
same." 60  The Commission has stated that it is implicit in this
section that appropriate attention be directed to local live pro-
gramming. 6 1
The present position of the FCC in the programming area
seems to be a supervisory one. The individual licensee is primar-
54 NETWORK PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, REPORT AN STATEMENT OF POLICY,
25 Fed Reg. 7291, 7294 (1960).
55 Id. at 7295.
50 See, Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competitive Applicants, 43
M1n .L. REv. 479 (1959).
57 NETWORK PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, REPORT AND STATEMENT OF POLICY,
25 Fed Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
58 Ibid.
59 Id. at 7294.
60 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1958).
61 NETWORK PROGRAMING INQUIRY, REPORT AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.
25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7294 (1960).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1962
ily responsible for choosing the programs that he will broadcast
and determining the emphasis that he will place on the various
elements of his program format. The FCC has the right to review
the licensee's past broadcast conduct to insure that the over-all
balance of his schedule is in the public interest, and it also has
the right to view the applicant's proposed programming schedule
to insure that the public interest will be served in the future.
As a practical matter, most of the regulating accomplished by
the Commission is indirect: by a letter or speech of a Commis-
sioner, by a public notice in the Federal Register, or by disap-
proving a practice in dictum but granting a license or renewal
thereof. The policies announced by the Commission in these ways
are virtually unassailable by the licensee. Judicial review is un-
available because letters, speeches, public notices, and dicta are
not considered legally binding upon the licensee, as rules and or-
ders promulgated by the FCC would be. If the licensee has no
legal obligation he has no standing to challenge the policy until
such time as the policy is actually made obligatory on him.62
Another consideration is important at this point. The effec-
tiveness of authority presented in this way rests upon the eco-
nomic fact that the value of a Commission license far outweighs
the value that could be obtained by challenging the FCC's pro-
gramming policies at the risk of losing such license. Stations will
usually endeavor to conform to the wishes of the Commission
rather than chance being removed from the air at renewal time.63
Because of this it is unlikely that the right of the FCC to
exercise authority in the programming area will be challenged in
the near future. However, in view of the previous discussion, if
such a challenge is made it is probable that the Supreme Court
will approve the authority of the FCC in the programming area
as a necessary function of the Commission to act in the public
interest.
V. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS
In discussing the various approaches utilized in approving or
criticizing the power of the FCC in the programming area, it is
important to keep in mind the purpose of the Communications
Act and the limitations imposed by Congress and the Constitu-
tion. As pointed out earlier, the Radio Act was enacted originally
to alleviate the problem of frequency overlap between stations.
62 For a more detailed discussion of the supervisory power of the FCC,
see 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.03 (1958).
63 Ibid.
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The purpose of the subsequent Communications Act is "to make
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States, a
rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charge."'6 4 In providing for this purpose, Congress worded the
Communications Act in terms of public interest. In view of the
foregoing, it is reasonable to assume that a large part, if not all,
of the public interest mentioned by Congress was the assurance
that radio stations did not interfere with each other by overlapping
frequencies. Creation of this assurance would establish the "rapid,
efficient" radio service desired by Congress. This seemed to be
the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Sanders case 5 when it
stated that the broadcasting field was open to anyone showing
"competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability
to make good use of the assigned channel," 66 provided an available
channel existed. Further, section 326 of the Communications Act
provides essentially the same protection offered by the first amend-
ment to the Constitution. It is arguable, therefore, that by includ-
ing section 326 in the Act, Congress wished to emphasize that the
radio industry, though subject to regulation by the FCC, was to
be afforded the same protection by the first amendment as other
communications media not governmentally controlled.
Under the broad interpretation given by the Supreme Court
to the term "public interest," the Commission has the right to view
the proposed program schedules and the past broadcasting conduct
of an applicant. One of the approaches used by the Commission
and the courts in justifying this interpretation is that the radio and
tele~rision media are unique because they are limited by the fre-
quency spectrum available for use. In the NBC case 67 the Supreme
Court followed this approach in allowing the Commission to review
programming and refused to accept the premise that the first
amendment was being violated. The Court stated:0 8
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the
limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic,
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation.
It is certainly true that radio facilities are limited and all who
wish to use them may not do so. If Congress had not exercised its
64 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
65 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See note 12 supra.
66 Id. at 475.
67 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
68 Id. at 226.
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power to regulate the use of radio frequencies, this limitation would
have proved injurious to the public as the resulting interference
would have nullified the effectiveness of the medium. It was there-
fore necessary, in the public interest, to regulate the number of
stations that can broadcast in any one area and to designate the
frequency on which each may operate. Other media of communi-
cation do not have this technical limitation and the public is not
injured if an unlimited number of each exist in any area. Thus,
there is no need to require a licensing of the other media. The
Commission's position seems to be, however, that the public interest
requires not only that the FCC designate the number of stations
that may broadcast in any one area and the frequency on which
each may operate, but also that the FCC insure that the program-
ming of each licensee is balanced to the needs of the community.69
In other words, because the public can receive only a limited num-
ber of stations, the FCC has the duty to see that those stations
which are received by the public are broadcasting an acceptable
program format.
The first amendment draws no distinction as to the various
means of communication.70 It flatly prohibits the abridgment of
freedom of speech or the press. Before it is to be conceded that
the public interest requires that the FCC insure balanced pro-
gramming in the radio and television industry, while other media
have no such obligation, it should first be established that not only
has radio a unique limitation which requires licensing, but that the
other media are not limited as to public reception.
A survey of the fifty largest cities in the the United States
indicates that each city has an average of three to four television
stations,7 1 while the average number of newspaper publishers in
each city is only two.7 2 The obvious reason that a greater number of
newspapers does not exist is an economic one. The public demand
69 NETWORK PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, REPORT AND STATEMENT OF POLICY,
25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7294 (1960): "It is the duty of the Commission, in
the first instance, to select persons as licensees who meet the qualifi-
cations laid down in the Act, and on a continuing basis to review the
operations of such licensees from time to time to provide reasonable
assurance to the public that the broadcast service it receives is such
as its direct and justifiable interest requires."
70 Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954)
(Douglas, J., concurring): "Motion pictures are of course a different
medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage,
the novel, or magazine. But the First Amendment draws no dis-
tinction between the various methods communicating ideas."
71 GOLENPAUL ASSOCIATES, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 390 (1962). The
average per city according to the statistics given is 3.6.
72 Id. at 308.
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simply will not support a larger number. Thus, it may be said,
from a practical standpoint, that the number of newspapers that
can be published in any one geographical area is also necessarily
limited. While it is true that the limitation in radio and television
is a physical one and the limitation in the newspaper industry is an
economic one, both limitations have the same effect-they effec-
tively determine how many of each medium are to exist in any one
geographical area, and, as shown by the survey above, it appears
that the newspaper industry is even more limited to those who wish
to engage in the communications industry than is the radio and tele-
vision industry. To argue, therefore, that because the radio and
television industry is limited, the FCC has the duty to view past
broadcasting performance and proposed program schedules to in-
sure that those who are given a license to broadcast will use the
license in the public interest is to give the industry a uniqueness
which it does not in fact possess. The radio and television industry
is unique in that its particular limitation necessarily requires li-
censing, but it is not unique because it is limited to those who wish
to enter it. Every communications medium is confronted by limita-
tions, whether they be market, cost, or physical! To distinguish
the radio and television industry because of its particular limitation,
and to allow government review on that basis is to read a distinc-
tion into the first amendment which does not exist.
Another approach used by the Commission in attempting to
distinguish the particular medium it regulates was stated in a Net-
work Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy
73 :
We recognize that the broadcasting medium presents problems
peculiar to itself which are not necessarily subject to the same
rules governing other media of communication. As we stated in
our petition in Grove Press, Inc. and Readers Subscription, Inc. v.
Robert K. Christenberry (Case No. 25,861) filed in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, "radio and TV programs enter
the home and are readily available not only to the average normal
adult but also to children and to the emotionally immature * * *
Thus, for example, while a nudist magazine may be within the
protection of the First Amendment * * * the televising of nudes
might well raise a serious question of programming contrary to
18 U.S.C. 1464. * * * Similarly, regardless of whether the 'four-
letter' words and sexual description set forth in 'Lady Chatterly's
Lover', (when considered in the context of the whole book) make
the book obscene for mailability purposes, the utterance of such
words or the depiction of such sexual activity on radio or TV
would raise similar public interest and section 1464 questions."
Nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind that the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press like the First Amendment's
command do not vary.
73 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7292 (1960).
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While the Commission's assertion that radio and television
programs come into the home and reach children is clearly beyond
argument, to justify the distinction the Commission is attempting
to make requires a similar assertion that the other media do not
likewise come into the homes of the public. It is reasonable to
assume that a large proportion of the publications purchased by the
public are taken into their homes for reading, and that these pub-
lications are kept out of the reach of children, if at all, by parental
supervision. One might well ask why parental supervision should
not be responsible for the programs the child views on television or
hears over the radio. With various publications containing an ad-
vance description of programs to be broadcast by each station, the
emotionally mature persons of the household should be able to as-
certain which programs the less mature members should not view.
Perhaps the strongest approach used by the FCC to justify
its entrance into the programming area is that its particular method
of reviewing past broadcast conduct and proposed programming
schedules does not violate section 326 or the first amendment. The
position of the Commission is that the individual applicant chooses
his entire program format without supervision by the Commission,
and is free to broadcast as he wishes during the three-year license
period. At renewal time, however, the Commission will take the
past record into account and look at the proposals an applicant
makes for the future, but this is done only to see that the balance
and structure of the applicant's format meets the needs of the com-
munity he reaches.7 4
As was previously noted, the court stated in the KFKB case7 5
that reviewing past broadcast conduct was not censorship because
the programs were not subjected to prior scrutiny. This argument
would be much stronger were it not for the fact that the Commis-
sion not only looks to see that an applicant broadcasted properly in
the past, but it carries the past performance forward as a demon-
stration of what the applicant is likely to do in the future.76 This
was the opinion of one writer 77 who strongly criticized the KFKB
case by stating:
The inference is irresistable that the application was denied be-
cause of what the appellant intended to release in the future; the
commission was in the position of saying that in view of the appel-
lant's past conduct they knew what the future conduct would be
74 See note 69 supra.
75 See text at note 53 supra.
76 This is indicated by the opinion in Sangamon Valley Television Corp.,
22 FCC 1167 (1957), quoted in the text at note 52 supra.
77 Caldwell, Censorship of Radio Programs, 1 J. RADIO L. 441, 470 (1931).
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as well as if the actual programs had been submitted to them, that
they considered those (future) programs, had disapproved them
and would not license appellant to release them. This is not some-
thing resembling censorship, it is censorship in fact, the very es-
sence of it. To say, under these circumstances, that because past
releases had not in fact been subjected to prior scrutiny, therefore
there was no censorship, is a misconception of the practical effect
of the decision as well as of what constitutes censorship.
One further point that should be noted here is the apparent dif-
ficulty in reconciling the KFKB case with Near v. Minnesota,78 de-
cided in the same year by the Stipreme Court. The Near case held
previous restraint of publication of a newspaper unconstitutional.
It was argued by one writer 79 at the time both cases were decided
that:
Subsequent punishment is that form of government control which
prevents publication through fear of consequent penalties or the
deprivation of some right. Obviously, the fear of punishment has
the indirect effect of a previous restraint.
The indirect previous restraint involved in the radio and television
industry is the refusal to renew a license which is of obviously great
value to the licensee. If the two opinions are compared, the logical
conclusion to be drawn is that a radio or television station can be
denied the right to exist for broadcasting material that is deemed
not in the public interest by the FCC, while the press is protected
by the first amendment and can publish the same material without
fear of governmental repercussions."0
The criticisms applied to reviewing past conduct can be applied
even more strongly to the viewing of future programming sched-
ules by the FCC. The Commission, however, points out that the
"ascertainment of the needed elements of the broadcast matter...
remains primarily the function of the licensee.""' Thus, the FCC
seems to say that the licensee is free to choose his programs, but
the Commission still has the power to judge whether or not the
78 283 I.S. 697 (1931).
79 Siegel, Censorship in Radio, 7 Am L. REv. 1, 18 (1936).
80 Ibid: "For the oral *dissemination of language, a broadcasting station
can be deprived of its very existence, whereas the daily press would
be protected by the First Amendment if this same material were pub-
lished. The net result then is that every broadcaster in the country
awaits with fear and trembling, the action of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission. Even though the broadcaster study published
regulations with ever so much diligence, he must need have a crystal
ball or a clairvoyant to know whether the Commission is going to
like his programs or not."
81 NETWORK PROGRAMIVMING INQUIRY, REPORT AND STATEMENT OF PoLIcY, 25
Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
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over-all balance of the programming schedule is in the public in-
terest. It is difficult to surmise why the distinction is made be-
tween one program and a multitude of programs. Surely, if judging
an individual program would involve the taste of the Commission,
judging a group of programs necessarily involves the same taste.
In other words, it would be an impossibility for the Commission to
determine whether or not the schedule of programs for a typical
week is good or bad if they could not determine whether the indi-
vidual programs within that schedule are good or bad. Yet, the
Commission has repeatedly denied itself the right to examine in-
dividual programs on the ground that such judgment would surely
be censorship.8 2 The reasoning to be extracted seems to be that
taste judgments and censorship decrease as the amount of matter
under scrutiny increases. Overlooked is the basic fact that in de-
termining whether either an individual program or a schedule of
programs is in the public interest, a conclusion must be drawn as to
the needs of the public. If that conclusion is said to rest on taste
in one instance, it cannot be said to rest less on personal taste in
the other.
The difficulty in allowing the FCC to exercise control over the
over-all policies of a licensee, while refusing it authority to prohibit
the broadcasting of an individual program, is that the first amend-
ment, and presumably section 326, are applicable in both areas.
The danger in allowing the FCC to control the policies of a licensee
can readily be pointed out by an analysis of Mayflower Broadcast-
ing Corp.,83 where the Commission determined that editorializing
by stations was not in the public interest. In that case Mayflower
and the Yankee Network were both applying for the same license.
Yankee finally received the approval of the Commission only after
filing affidavits that its editorial policy had been changed. The
Commission effectively changed this policy of the station by stat-
ing: "A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of
the licensee.''8 4
The position of the Commission, commonly referred to as the
Mayflower doctrine, seemingly is in accord with the Commission's
82 Id. at 7294; Hearing on the Nomination of Newton N. Minnow To Be A
Member of the Federal Communications Commission For The Unex-
pired Term From July 1, 1954, and for a 7-year Term Commencing
July 1, 1961, Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1961). This reasoning is dis-
cussed in 2 CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 641
(1947).
83 8 FCC 333 (1940).
84 Id. at 340.
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present position. No individual program was censored. The Com-
mission merely declared that editorializing by a station was not in
the public interest, which implies that the Commission found that
the communities reached by Yankee did not require or need editori-
alization. The FCC did not, however, explain why newspapers are
free to editorialize and radio is not. During the nine years that
the Mayflower doctrine remained in effect, no station felt that it
was worth risking a license to challenge it. Then in 1949, a Com-
missioner asserted that the doctrine "violated the First Amend-
ment."8 5 It is interesting to note that the amount of editorializing
that a station proposes is now one of the factors to be considered
in the over-all balance of its programming schedule."6
One further limitation upon agency control, heretofore un-
mentioned in this article, was stated by the Supreme Court in the
Sanders case: 8 7
The sections [of the Act] dealing with broadcasting demonstrate
that Congress has not, in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the
principle of free competition, as it has done in the case of rail-
roads, in respect of which regulation involves suppression of waste-
ful practices due to competition, the regulation of rates and
charges, and other measures which are unnecessary if free com-
petition is to be permitted.
Because broadcasting is essentially a free enterprise, it is rea-
sonable to assume that a licensee will choose the programs he
broadcasts in a manner that will allow him to effectively compete
with his own and other media of communication. The industry
is supported by advertisers wanting to exhibit their products or
services to the largest possible audience. Therefore, for the licensee
to compete with other stations, it is necessary for him to determine
which programs will receive the greatest approval from the audi-
ence he reaches. The FCC realizes how effective public approval
is in influencing the opinion of the licensee, for it recently stated: 8 8
But the most important factor is public demand. The public
knows what it wants and is both quick and eager to make its de-
sires known. That the public has this power to influence the pro-
gramming directed toward it we deem appropriate, the public
being, after all, the beneficiaries of the trusts we create.
It is apparent that the program format of a station licensee de-
termines his effectiveness in competition. If then, he chooses his
85 Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246, 1259 (1949) (sep-
arate opinion of Commissioner Jones).
86 See criterion considered by the FCC discussed in the text at note 55
supra.
87 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
88 Enterprise Co., Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 816, 818 (FCC 1954).
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programming schedule on the basis of FCC policy instead of public
acceptance, his competitive effectiveness is reduced. The fact that
other station licensees are also regulated in the same manner by the
Commission becomes less important when it is realized that the
radio and television licensee not only faces competion from other
stations in his own media, but also must compete with the other
forms of communication, such as motion pictures, newspapers, and
magazines, 0 which have no similar regulation. If the licensee bends
to the judgment of the Commission, he loses the optimum public sup-
port he could potentially enjoy, and thereby loses a portion of fi-
nancial support from advertisers who now prefer to use a more ef-
fective medium of communication. As long as competition deter-
mines the financial viability of the radio and television industry,
it is arguable that competition, and not a governmental agency,
should determine the programming policy of the industry.
The foregoing discussion casts doubt upon the FCC's power
to enter into the programming area. If it is to be conceded, how-
ever, that the radio and television industry is so dynamic and its
effect upon the public is so great that judicial decision should
declare that its freedom to broadcast program matter should be
supervised to some degree, it is questionable whether or not the
"public interest" standard is sufficiently clear to allow such restric-
tion. 90 While this criterion may be sufficient in delegating to the
FCC the power to issue licenses and allocate frequencies, it is
questionable whether or not such criterion is sufficient to allow the
Commission to enter the first amendment area and view the pro-
gramming policies of a licensee. In Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,9 the
Supreme Court refused to allow a censorship board to prohibit the
showing of a motion picture on grounds that it was "sacrilegious."
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: 92
We not only do not know but cannot know what is condemnable
by "sacrilegious." And if we cannot tell, how are those to be
governed by the statute to tell.
It is this impossibility of knowing how far the form of "sacri-
legious" carries the proscription of religious subjects that makes
the term unconstitutionally vague.
89 GOLENPAUL ASSOCIATES, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 582 (1962) in-
dicates that a large part of the advertising percentages previously held
by other media have been reduced while the percentage held by tele-
vision has increased. It is implicit in these statistics that the various
media of communications are in competition with each other for
maximum support from the advertising market.
90 See 2 VAND. L. REv. 464 (1949).
91 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
92 Id. at 531 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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If the term "sacrilegious" is too vague to justify imposing
restraints upon a communications medium, it is tenable to assert
that "public interest, convenience, or necessity" is even more so.
The danger of such a broad standard is clearly pointed out in the
Mayflower case 93 and its subsequent ramifications. In Kunz v.
New York,94 the Supreme Court explained the necessity of stating
adequate reasons to justify prior restraint of speech by stating:
It is noteworthy that there is no mention in the ordinance of rea-
sons for which such a permit application can be refused. This
interpretation allows ... an administrative official, to exercise
discretion in denying subsequent permit applications on the basis
of his interpretation, at that time, of what is deemed to be con-
duct condemned by the ordinance. We have here, then, an ordi-
nance which gives an administrative official discretionary power
to control the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the
streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid
as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
It would seem that this statement is directly applicable to the
power of the FCC in the programming area. At the present time
the Commission has wide discretionary power to determine what
is and what is not in the public interest. While this standard is
adequate for the purposes of requiring licensees to be technically
and financially capable to broadcast, it is too vague to be of use
in determining questions in the area of freedom of speech and of
the press.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In view of the reasons behind empowering the Commission to
issue and renew licenses, and in view of the limitations provided in
the first amendment and the Act itself, it is questionable whether
the present situation can be justified. Most of the support for the
Commission's argument for control comes from the "public interest"
standard established by Congress. The laws enacted by Congress,
however, must be read with the limitations imposed by the Consti-
tution. In the present situation, it is arguable that Congress in-
tended the public interest standard to be the interest of the public
in seeing that radio stations would not overlap and cause a loss of
the effective frequencies. The Commission has the power to do this
without entering into the programming area of the industry, for, as
previously noted, the programming policy is only one of many fac-
93 8 FCC 333 (1940).
94 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951). In the Kunz case New York City had an ordi-
nance making it unlawful to hold public worship on the streets without
a permit. Appellant was a Baptist minister who previously had ob-
tained a permit which was revoked. He again applied and was re-
fused. Subsequently he was convicted for violating the ordinance.
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tors which the Commission takes into consideration when granting
or renewing a license.
If the doctrine of free competition is to prevail, as was indi-
cated in the Sanders case,9 5 the industry must be free to determine
the public demand and to cater to that demand. When govern-
mental control is substituted the dangers sought to be prevented by
the Constitution begin to loom beneath the surface. This is perhaps
best expressed by the dissenting opinion in Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Pollak: 96
Once a man is forced to submit to one type of program he can
be forced to submit to another.
It may be but a short step from a cultural program to a politi-
cal program .... The strength of our system is in the dignity,
resourcefulness and the intelligence of our people. Our confidence
is in their ability to make the wisest choice.
If, however, future judicial determination indicates that the
FCC may remain in the programming area, it is submitted that
the present standard is too vague. A more definite and restricted
standard would alleviate much of the confusion presently existing
in the area. Until such time as Congress does prescribe a more
definite standard, it is questionable whether the FCC should be
allowed to use the programming policies of an applicant in deter-
mining whether or not a license or a renewal should issue.
William B. Stukas, '64
95 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See text at note 87 supra.
9 343 U.S. 454, 469 (1952) (Black J., dissenting).
